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ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
Laura M. Dalton
Dennis F. Kerrigan, Jr.
Environmental law and bankruptcy law are two distinct and
highly specialized areas of law which have increasingly clashed in the
past decade. The courts have been forced to solve these conflicts
one step at a time with very little legislative guidance. This article
examines the relationship between and the policies underlying the two
bodies of law, focusing upon the effect of the automatic stay upon
governmental environmental enforcement actions; the dischargeability
of obligations to clean up hazardous waste sites; and the power of a
bankruptcy trustee to abandon contaminated property.
BACKGROUND
Congress has reworked both environmental law and bankruptcy
law in recent years.' Nevertheless, amendments to the major federal
environmental laws and the revamping of the Bankruptcy Code,2 both
completed as late as 1986, have not resolved many of the conflicts
that existed prior to their amendment. The conflicts which have arisen
between the two bodies of law are primarily the result of their
differing aims. While bankruptcy law deals with relieving legal
obligations, environmental law imposes obligations in order to
implement specific policies. The Third Circuit has stated:
1. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330, as
amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353 (1990); Federal Water Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387,
as amended by Water Quality Act of 1987 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (1987);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, as amended by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
3. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6992 (1988); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9606 (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act
of 1976 (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
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On the one hand, the federally created bankruptcy
policy requires that the assets of a debtor be preserved
and protected, so that in time they may be equitably
distributed to all creditors without unfair preference.
On the other hand, the environmental policies . . . re-
quire those within its jurisdiction to preserve and
protect natural resources and to rectify damage to the
environment which they have caused.
One body of law thus tends to impose liability, while the other is
designed to relieve it.
Recent environmental legislation at both the state and federal
levels has imposed strict liability in many instances on a variety of
property owners and the operators of polluting facilities.s Many
environmental laws subject defendants to joint and several liability for
cleanup costs, 6 for injury to wildlife,7 and for the cost of bringing
continuing operations into compliance with the laws.8 Additionally,
the courts may order the environmental defendant to pay civil
penalties9 and may subject him to criminal prosecution for contempt
of court should he be unable or unwilling to effectuate a cleanup as
ordered.10 Congress has recognized that each person or governmental
or corporate entity has a responsibility to contribute to the
4. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,
269 (3d Cir. 1984).
5. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (FWPCA),
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1321 (1988); SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
8. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
9. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9606 (1988); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
10. Id.
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preservation and enhancement of the environment.11 In order to
ensure that these parties meet their responsibilities, Congress has
directed the government to use all practicable means to assure that
all Americans enjoy a safe and healthful environment.1 2
Four types of relief are provided to the debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code. The specific type of relief available depends upon
what the debtor is seeking to accomplish and his eligibility.13
Although the relief varies in both scope and applicability, the
underlying theme remains consistent: to give the debtor a "fresh
start." For example, in a reorganization under Chapter 11, the debtor
is given a fresh start through a court order confirming a
reorganization plan that is binding on all parties.14  Similarly, in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy in which the eligible property of the debtor is
liquidated, the debtor is given a fresh start when the court discharges
his prebankruptcy debts at the end of the case.15
In the mid 1980s, the Supreme Court decided two cases16
which, along with an important case decided by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals17, serve as a focal point for the analysis of the
interplay between bankruptcy and environmental law. Lower courts,
in applying the reasoning of those cases to diverse factual situations
and to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, have continued to
11. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,
4331 (1988).
12. Id.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988); see also G.TREISTER, R. TROST, L. FORMAN, K.
KLEE, & R. LEVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 15 (1986) [hereinafter
TREISTER].
14. TREISTER, supra note 13, at 17.
15. Id. at 16-7.
16. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494 (1985); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
17. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267
(3d Cir. 1984).
4 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
wrestle with conflicting statutes and questions of policy.18  The
significance of these issues is illustrated by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) prediction that between
twenty-five and thirty percent of businesses that run land disposal
facilities will file for bankruptcy within the next fifty years.19 In
addition, the EPA estimates that cleanup costs will range between
two and four million dollars per land disposal facility.
20
THE EFFECT OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
A considerable amount of recent litigation has involved the
issue of whether the automatic stay provided in the Bankruptcy Code
precludes environmental liability. Unique to bankruptcy law, the
automatic stay acts as an umbrella over the property of the debtor's
estate, protecting the property from any unilateral action that would
either interfere with its possession or seek to enforce any rights
against it.21 The automatic stay operates to prevent:
the commencement or continuation, including the
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial,
administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before
the commencement of the case under this title, or to
18. The purpose of this article is to provide an update on the interpretations
given by the courts to these landmark cases in order to determine whether the
subsequent decisions have strictly adhered to the holdings of the Supreme Court.
Due to the fact that this is a developing area of the law, and because of the
complexity of the issues involved, one should not depend upon this article as an
exhaustive presentation of the law, but rather, should serve to alert practicing
attorneys to the trends and developments which may merit close attention in future
transactions or litigation.
19. Note, Creditor's Rights When Federal Bankruptcy Laws Conflict with State
EnvironmentalAgency Enforcement Powers after Midlantic National Bank, 48 U. PITT.
L. REV. 879, 979 n.1 (1987).
20. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS JEOPARDIZED WHEN FACILITIES CEASE
OPERATING 18 (1986).
21. TREISTER, supra note 13, at 123.
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recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title.22
The stay operates automatically upon the filing of a voluntary, joint,
or involuntary petition under any chapter of the Code.23 Generally,
the stay provides the debtor with complete, but temporary, relief from
creditors and also serves to prevent the debtor's estate from being
drained before a bankruptcy plan is effectuated. 24
Although Congress intended that the stay would give debtors
breathing room by suspending actions other than the bankruptcy
proceedings, Congress also recognized that the stay was vulnerable to
abuse by debtors seeking to frustrate necessary government functions.
Congress had a legitimate concern "that the bankruptcy court would
become a sanctuary for environmental wrongdoers, among others."25
To combat this concern, Congress enacted several exceptions to the
stay. Sections 362(b)(4) and (5) for example, exempt from the stay
the commencement or continuation of an action by a governmental
unit utilizing its police or regulatory power.26 That exception,
however, contains an exception of its own that leaves money
judgments subject to the stay.27 Commentators have referred to this
"exception to the exception" as the "pecuniary interest rule."28
The first major case to consider the conflict between
environmental and bankruptcy law, Penn Terra Limited v. Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources,29 discussed the "exception to
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
23. Id. at 183.
24. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,
271 (3d Cir. 1984).
25. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4),(5) (1988).
27. Id. § 362(b)(5).
28. Smillie, The Effect of the Bankruptcy Stay on Environmental Cleanup
Litigation, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 77 (1989).
29. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
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the exception." In Penn Terra, the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources (PDER) found that Penn Terra Limited
(Penn Terra), a coal mining concern, was operating its mines in
violation of various state environmental protection statutes.30 Penn
Terra entered into a consent order and agreement to rectify those
violations.31 Approximately one year after entering into the consent
agreement, Penn Terra filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. PDER
then brought an equitable action against Penn Terra to enforce the
terms of the consent order.32 In response, Penn Terra filed a Petition
for Contempt in the bankruptcy court contending that PDER's
equitable action violated the automatic stay.33 PDER claimed in
defense that the proceedings fell under the police power exception to
the stay under section 362(b)(4) and (5).34
On appeal, the Third Circuit applied the "pecuniary interest
rule"35 and held that PDER's actions did not violate the automatic
stay.36 The pecuniary interest rule states "that a governmental unit
will not be permitted to proceed against the debtor when it seeks
simply to collect a monetary obligation or otherwise to protect its
own pecuniary interests. 37 Applying this rule to the facts of Penn
Terra, in which the company filed its bankruptcy petition after the
entry of a consent order requiring it to take steps to comply with
state law, the court held that the automatic stay was inapplicable
because the state of Pennsylvania sought an injunction requiring
30. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 269.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 270.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Smillie, supra note 28, at 82.
36. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 278.
37. Smillie, supra note 28, at 82.
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compliance, rather than monetary damages.38 The court stated that
PDER's goal was not to collect money damages for civil fines or
cleanup costs because the agency had not undertaken a cleanup at
the time of the suit.39 The fact that a successful injunction would
require the expenditure of money by the debtor did not render the
state's claim in violation of the stay.40 The court held that the test
to be applied in Penn Terra was whether the relief sought was the
type traditionally settled by the payment of damages.
41
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the
applicability of the automatic stay to actions to enforce compliance
with environmental laws, the Court did discuss a party's reliance upon
Penn Terra in a footnote of another opinion. In Ohio v. Kovacs,42 the
state of Ohio obtained an injunction ordering the defendant to clean
up a hazardous waste site.43 After the court appointed a receiver to
accomplish this purpose, the defendant filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.44 The State of Ohio then filed suit in bankruptcy court
seeking a declaration that Kovacs' obligation under the prior
injunction was not dischargeable within the meaning of the Code.45
The State argued that the pecuniary interest rule of Penn Terra, which
would stay a suit to enforce a monetary judgement, has applicability
in the context of whether or not a debt is dischargeable.46 The Court
38. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 278.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 278-79.
41. Id. at 278.
42. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
43. Id. at 275.
44. Id. at 276.
45. Id. at 276-77. This article discusses the issue of dischargeability in the
following section.
46. Id. at 277.
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implicitly agreed with the Third Circuit's analysis in Penn Terra, but
differentiated that case from the facts in Kovacs:
[I]n [Penn Terra], there had been no appointment of a
receiver who had the duty to comply with the state law
and who was seeking money from the bankrupt. The
automatic stay provision does not apply to suits to
enforce the regulatory statutes of the state, but the
enforcement of such a judgment by seeking money from
the bankrupt ... is another matter.47
Following the Kovacs decision, the Court summed up the
pecuniary interest rule in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection48 when it stated that section
362(b)(5) "permits the Government to enforce 'nonmonetary'
judgments against a debtor's estate."49
Since the Penn Terra decision, some courts have followed the
bright line rule of pecuniary interest, but most courts have expanded
the exceptions to the automatic stay provisions. In In re
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.,50 the Fifth Circuit followed the
analysis set out in Penn Terra in holding that the EPA's suit to force
compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA)51 was not stayed.5 2 The dispute in Commonwealth Oil
arose when the EPA brought administrative actions against
Commonwealth Oil Refining Company (CORCO) to force the
corporation to comply with state and federal hazardous waste laws.
53
CORCO subsequently filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and
moved for an order from the bankruptcy court to determine the
47. Id. at 283 n.11.
48. 474 U.S. 494 (1985).
49. Id. at 503.
50. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1976).
52. 805 F.2d at 1183.
53. Id. at 1179.
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applicability of the automatic stay to the EPA's impending
enforcement actions.54 CORCO averred that section 362 (a)(1), the
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, stayed the EPA's order
to cease storing, treating, or disposing of hazardous waste.5 CORCO
argued unsuccessfully that no imminent and identifiable harm existed
because its facility was shut down.5 1 On appeal CORCO asserted
that the EPA's administrative action required the expenditure of
money and thus would fall within the monetary judgment exception
under Section 362(b)(5). 57 The court held that the expenditure of
money by CORCO required for its compliance was merely incidental
and did not operate to convert an enforcement action into a suit for
money damages.58 The Fifth Circuit thus employed the Penn Terra
analysis regarding applicability of the stay to environmental
enforcement actions.59
Other courts have not followed the Penn Terra analysis as
closely. In United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,D6 the third circuit retreated
from its earlier holding in Penn Terra. In Nicolet, the EPA detected
and cleaned up contamination in violation of the Comprehensive
54. In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 58 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1985).
55. Id. at 610.
56. CORCO relied on Midlantic for this argument which the court ultimately
rejected on the grounds that the language of the exceptions to the automatic stay
is unambiguous and does not limit the police or regulatory power exceptions to
situations of urgent public necessity. Commonwealth Oil, 805 F.2d at 1185-86.
57. Id. at 1186.
58. Id. at 1187.
59. In United States v. F.E. Gregory & Sons, Inc., 58 Bankr. 590 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1986), the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania employed the
Penn Terra analysis as well, highlighting the relevance of a petition filed under
Chapter 11 as opposed to Chapter 7. The court stated that under Chapter 11, the
debtor should be able to cleanup the site himself after reorganization and,
therefore, the government sought performance rather than money damages. Id. at
592.
60. 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
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Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA)6 ' prior to Nicolet's petition for Chapter 11 reorganization.
When the EPA brought a suit to recover response costs from Nicolet,
the district court stayed the proceeding. 62 EPA objected and moved
for reconsideration on the grounds that it was exercising its police or
regulatory power, and therefore was exempt from the stay provision.
The district court agreed with the EPA's argument and Nicolet
appealed.63 The EPA maintained that "assuming a verdict for the
agency -- no execution in the judgment would be sought."' 6  The
Third Circuit held that both parties' interpretations of the statutory
language were legitimate and turned to the legislative history to
resolve whether the EPA's action was of the type Congress had
intended to fall within the exception to the stay.6s The court quoted
the legislative committee reports as follows:
[W]here a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental
protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police
or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for
violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not
stayed under the automatic stay.66
The court, therefore, held that the government should be allowed to
go forward to establish its claim.
At first glance the result in Nicolet, allowing the government
to go forward to prove liability in order to enter a judgment against
the debtor, appears inconsistent with the court's analysis in Penn
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-75 (1980).
62. Nicolet, 857 F.2d. at 203.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 208.
66. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 989, 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5838; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6299).
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Terra, which looked to whether the relief sought was the type
traditionally settled by the payment of money damages. The court in
Nicolet justified this apparent inconsistency by noting that the plaintiff
in Penn Terra sought to seize the debtor's property in order to satisfy
the judgment, but in the case at hand the EPA was merely seeking
to enter a judgment.67 The court reasoned that "[b]y simply
permitting the government's claim to be reduced to a judgment, no
seizure of property takes place. 6S8 The court further justified
exempting the action from the stay provision because its deterrent
effect related to the police power exception detailed in Penn Terra.69
In environmental cases courts have rejected the premise that
the debtor's estate should be protected from expending resources to
litigate the application of the stay.70 In considering this question the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to adopt the premise that
"preservation of the debtor's estate is of greater priority in the
statutory scheme set forth by Congress in Title 11 than is the
enforcement of environmental protection laws explicitly intended to
be excepted from the automatic stay."'71 Therefore, a debtor may
67. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 209.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 210. Several other courts have used a similar line of reasoning.
See, e.g., United States v. Standard Metals Corp., 49 Bankr. 623 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1985) (EPA permitted to establish liability for a suspended civil penalty under the
Clean Water Act). Several other courts have used a similar line of reasoning.
United States v. Mattiace Industries Inc., 73 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(EPA allowed to maintain action to establish amount due from the company for
CERCLA response costs); United States v. ILCO, Inc., No. 85-H-823-S (JHH)
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1985) (unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Order)
[Available on Westlaw, DCT Database] (government allowed to proceed with claim
to establish civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, and to establish liability for,
and enter judgment against, the company for the recovery of response costs under
CERCLA).
70. See, e.g., In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988) (state
governmental unit allowed to proceed to litigate to determine company's liability
and to fix civil penalties under Tennessee's Water Quality Control Act).
71. Id. at 297.
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have to use estate resources to petition the court to stay the
proceedings and to finance a defense, should the court allow the
government to go forward. Such a result is at odds with the
fundamental concept that the stay should allow parties to concentrate
on reorganization through consolidation of suits in the bankruptcy
court, rather than having to deal with the possibility of a number of
suits in various courts and jurisdictions.
DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS
In Ohio v. Kovacs,72 the Supreme Court addressed another
conflict between bankruptcy and environmental law: the
dischargeability of debts. The State of Ohio sued Kovacs in 1976 for
water pollution and the resulting fish kills. Individually and on behalf
of his business, Kovacs signed a stipulation which required him to
clean up the property, enjoined him from causing further harm, and
ordered a payment of $75,000 to the state to compensate for injury
to wildlife. 73 When Kovacs did not comply with his obligations under
the stipulation, the State obtained the appointment of a receiver for
Kovacs' assets in order to initiate the cleanup. Subsequently, Kovacs
filed for bankruptcy. The State of Ohio pursued Kovacs for the
remainder of the costs of the cleanup by seeking to discover his post
bankruptcy income. The State's complaint sought a declaration that
Kovacs' obligations under the stipulation were not "debts" subject to
discharge and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
question. Debts that arise before filing for bankruptcy are
dischargeable under section 727, subject to nine exceptions listed in
section 523. The State of Ohio did not rely on any of the exceptions,
but claimed instead that Kovacs' obligations were not "debts" at all.
The Code defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." 74 A "claim" is:
72. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
73. Id. at 276.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1979).
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(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal,
equitable, secured or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or
unsecured. 75
Despite the clear import of section 101(4), the State argued that the
injunction was not a "claim" because Kovacs' default was a breach of
a statute, not of a commercial contract. 76 The Court determined that
the State's argument was not consistent since it had conceded that
the $75,000 penalty for injury to wildlife was dischargeable. 77
The Court ruled for Kovacs and held that the State's action,
seeking to require Kovacs to clean up the site, was an attempt to
collect monetary damages and, therefore, was a debt dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 78 The Court agreed with the lower court's conclusion
that Ohio's right to an equitable remedy had been converted into
money damages by virtue of the fact that the State had appointed a
receiver and Kovacs could not comply with an order to clean up the
property.79 By appointing a receiver "[the State] dispossessed Kovacs,
removed his authority over the site, and divested him of assets that
75. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (emphasis added). Dischargeability is a distinct issue
from the applicability of the automatic stay provision. See United States v.
Gregory & Sons, Inc., 58.Bankr. 590, 592 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).
76. Ohio also argued that the breach did not give rise to a right to payment.
The Court, however referred to the legislative history of the Code, which
considered a right to an equitable remedy for a breach of performance of a claim
within the meaning of section 101(4)(B). Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 283.
79. Id. at 282-83.
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might have been used by him to clean up." 0 Since the state sought
money damages rather than personal performance on the part of
Kovacs, the Court agreed with the district court that disallowing the
discharge "'would subvert Congress' clear intention to give debtors a
fresh start."' 81  The Court therefore affirmed the lower court's
decision to discharge Kovacs' obligations under the prebankruptcy
injunction, which required Kovacs to compensate the state for injury
to wildlife and to clean up the existing pollution. The Court
suggested that a different outcome might have resulted if the State
had prosecuted Kovacs for noncompliance with environmental laws
or for civil or criminal contempt of court. Such prosecutions would
not have left Kovacs powerless to comply with the environmental
order.8 2
The Court in Kovacs stressed that even though the state could
not pursue its claim for cleanup costs, Kovacs, or anyone else
ultimately in possession of the property, "must comply with the
environmental laws of the state of Ohio."8 3 This language indicates
that no further damage to the environment would be excused under
the auspices of bankruptcy law. In addition, Kovacs remained subject
to prosecution for his violations of environmental law.84
Subsequent cases addressing the issue of the dischargeability
of environmental claims have expanded the rule established in Kovacs.
The decision in In re Robinson8s enlarged the rule enunciated in
Kovacs, which discharged debts of a purely monetary nature, by
permitting the discharge of facially nonmonetary debts. In Robinson
80. Id.
81. Id. at 281-82 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 282-83.
83. Id. at 285.
84. Id. at 284.
85. 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.), rev'd on other grounds, 55 Bankr. 355
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
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the debtor was under an affirmative duty to restore marshlands after
unlawfully using the property as a landfill in violation of both the
River and Harbor Act8 6 and the Clean Water Act. 7 The EPA
sought to force Robinson to perform the restoration work, but the
bankruptcy court discharged the debt. The court reasoned that to
comply with the order would cost the debtor money since he could
not comply solely through his own labor. The court reasoned that:
Because we do not have before us a case in which a
receiver or similar entity has entered the scenario, we
must either extend the reasoning contained in Kovacs
or hold that it is materially distinguishable from the
case before us. We have concluded that extension will
allow greater fidelity to the principles expressed by the
Supreme Court as we understand them, than would
finding the factual difference to require a legal
distinction.88
Even though the obligation was not on its face or de facto a money
judgment, the court found that one could easily convert it into dollars
by allowing persons equipped to restore the land to make bids for the
work. The court therefore expanded the definition of a "claim,"
limited in Kovacs to a situation where the debtor was dispossessed of
the land, to a situation where the debtor retained control of the
property.
In United States v. Whizco 9 the debtor was obligated to reclaim
a mining surface area under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977.90 The Sixth Circuit Court of 'Appeals
employed the same reasoning found in Robinson and discharged the
debt to the extent that it required the payment of money. The court
86. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1990).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1990).
88. In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. at 139.
89. 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
90. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1209-1279 (1990).
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did not discharge the debtor's personal obligation to reclaim portions
of the land with equipment he might own in the future.91 Although
affirmative obligations requiring the expenditure of money are likely
to be discharged under Robinson and Whizco, criminal remedies
remain a prosecutorial option.92 This option is viable because the
debts from the resulting fines are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 93
In In re Charter94  the district court discussed the
dischargeability of contingent claims under section 502 of the
Bankruptcy Code.95 The plaintiffs in that case were private parties
who sought indemnification by Charter for response costs for which
they were potentially liable. 96 Although the plaintiffs appropriately
presented their claim in bankruptcy proceedings, liability for the
environmental damage had not been established. Therefore, the
claim was contingent within the meaning of section 502(e)(1)(B) of
the Code and, was accordingly dischargeable. Plaintiffs tried to avoid
the application of section 502 by characterizing their claim as
91. In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. at 151.
92. Id. at 139.
93. An exception to the general dischargeability of debts is provided in the
Code for claims which are fines or penalties payable to the government which are
not compensation for pecuniary loss. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1990). See, e.g., In
re Carracino, 53 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985) (fine imposed for violations of
New Jersey state environmental law).
94. 81 Bankr. 644 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987), aft'd, 862 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir.
1989).
95. Section 502 provides, in relevant part:
[T]he court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or
contribution of an entity that is liable with the debtor on or has
secured the claim of a creditor to the extent that ...
(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as
of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for
reimbursement or contribution....
11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1) (1990).
96. Section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA allows a person to seek contribution or
reimbursement from any other liable or potentially liable party. 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)(1) (1988).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
indemnification rather than contribution. The court pointed out,
however, that plaintiffs seeking indemnification are parties falling
squarely within the language of section 502. The court discharged the
claim reasoning that the bankrupt's estate "should not be burdened
by estimated claims of a contingent nature when the underlying
claimant has recourse against the entity who is liable on the claim
with the debtor."97
ABANDONMENT OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY
In In re Quanta Resources Corporation,98 the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection issued an administrative
order requiring the corporation, Quanta, to clean up a site which was
polluted by leaking barrels of carcinogenic waste in violation of state
law. Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11.
Subsequently, similar violations of New York's environmental laws
were discovered at Quanta's operations in New York. Quanta's
trustee decided to abandon the property in New York and New
Jersey according to section 554(a) of the Code which provides that
"[a]fter notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property
of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." The bankruptcy
courts in both states approved the abandonment. 99  Both states
objected on the grounds that allowing abandonment in contravention
of state environmental laws violated section 959(b) of Title 28 of the
United States Code, which requires a trustee in bankruptcy to
97. In re Charter, 81 Bankr. at 648.
98. 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984).
99. Title to abandoned property passes from the estate to the party with a
prepetition possessory interest, Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n.12 (1985),
which means in a Chapter 7 case that the individual debtor or shell corporation
regains title but is without the resources to remedy the situation which creates an
ongoing violation.
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manage the property in compliance with state law.1'0 A divided
panel of the Third Circuit held that the abandonment power could
not override state law designed to protect the public interest.' °1 The
court of appeals expressed its view of the public policy concerns as
follows:
If trustees in bankruptcy are to be permitted to dispose
of hazardous wastes under the cloak of the
abandonment power, compliance with environmental
protection laws will be transformed into governmental
cleanup by default. It cannot be said that the
bankruptcy laws were intended to work such a radical
change in the nature of local public health and safety
regulation - the substitution of governmental action for
citizen compliance without an indication that Congress
so intended.10 2
In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection'0 3 the Court applied similar reasoning in
considering the relationship between public health and safety and
100. Section 959(b) provides:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver
or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the
United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and
operate the property in his possession according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property
is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor
thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1990). Although this provision appears to resolve the question
of whether a trustee can abandon property in contravention of state law, it does
not directly apply to an abandonment. Petitioner argued that section 959(b)
applied only when a trustee was operating a business and not when he was
liquidating it. The Court did make an analogy between the two provisions to
support the proposition that Congress did not intend for the Code to preempt all
state law, Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 762, without commenting on the precise
applicability of the section. Cf. In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 781 (Bankr. D. Me.
1987).
101. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 921-22.
103. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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bankruptcy laws. The Court held that "a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is
reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from
identified hazards."104 The Court limited its holding, however, in a
footnote which explained:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the
trustee by § 554 is a narrow one. It does not
encompass a speculative or indeterminate future
violation of such laws that may stem from
abandonment. The abandonment power' is not to be
fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated
to protect the public health or safety from imminent
and identifiable harm.Os
Because of this footnote, analysis in subsequent cases has focused on
the issue of whether the harm is an imminent threat to public safety
or health. Such analysis represents the balance struck by the Supreme
Court between bankruptcy and environmental concerns.
w6
The bankruptcy court in In re Franklin Signal Corp.,1' 7 held
that Midlantic did not preclude abandonment in all instances, and the
court fashioned a test to determine when abandonment should be
permitted. The test consisted of five factors: (1) the imminence of
the danger; (2) the extent of probable harm; (3) the amount of
hazardous substance; (4) the cost of compliance with environmental
law; and (5) the funds available for cleanup.1'8 The court concluded
that "[t]he trustee only needs to take adequate precautionary
measures to ensure that there is no imminent danger to the public as
104. Id. at 507.
105. Id. at 507 n.9.
106. Smillie, supra note 28, at 86; see, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856
F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1988) (Chapter 11 debtor allowed to abandon property on
which violation of state law existed because abandonment posed no imminent
threat to public health).
107. 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
108. Id. at 272.
20 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
a result of abandonment."1' 9 If such measures are taken, then the
court may permit abandonment of the property.
Another bankruptcy court also applied Midlantic in a less
restrictive manner, noting the "quandary" of the trustee who has "[o]n
one hand, . . . no funds which are not cash collateral but, under a
strict reading of Midlantic could be required to comply with state laws
and regulations which is impossible because of 363(c)(2)."'11  The
court resolved this predicament by interpreting Midlantic as putting
the issue within the court's discretion. The court explained: "We do
not believe the Supreme Court intended to place bankruptcy trustees
in such a predicament but rather that Midlantic requires the
bankruptcy court, in determining whether to permit abandonment,
take state environmental laws and regulations into consideration.""'
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
cited Franklin and Oklahoma Refining to support its less restrictive
analysis of Midlantic in In re Purco. 2 The court found support for
this interpretation in Midlantic itself: "wherein the Court instructed
that the trustee's petition to abandon will be denied unless the trustee
has 'formulat[ed] conditions that will adequately protect the public's
health and safety.' "1 3 The court allowed abandonment and concluded
that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources had
109. Id. at 272.
110. In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1986). Section 363(c)(2) prohibits the trustee from using, selling or leasing cash
collateral unless:
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral
consents; or
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale,
or lease in accordance with the provisions of the section.
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2).
111. In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. at 565.
112. 76 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
113. Id. at 533 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (emphasis added)).
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not shown that a clear and imminent danger to public health existed
or that the public was inadequately protected, 114 even assuming the
solid waste on the site was hazardous. 11s The court in Purco took the
expansive reading of Midlantic one step further by placing the burden
of proving that the waste constituted an imminent threat to the public
on the environmental agency.
Some bankruptcy courts have interpreted Midlantic to preclude
abandonment unless total compliance with the violated environmental
laws is possible. In In re Peerless Plating Co.,116 the bankrupt
company filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Code and thereafter
the EPA found that the company had violated CERCLA. The EPA
incurred the cleanup costs and sought reimbursement from the
bankruptcy trustee. The court began its analysis by discussing
Midlantic and noting its disagreement with the interpretation given
Midlantic by the court in Franklin. The court found that the "clear
impact of the Midlantic language," disallowed abandonment unless:
(1) the environmental law was so onerous as to interfere with
bankruptcy adjudication; (2) the environmental law was not created
to protect the public; or (3) the violation caused by abandonment was
merely speculative." 7 The court did not believe that complete
depletion of the estate due to compliance with CERCLA was the
type of onerous condition allowing abandonment that the Supreme
Court had in mind. Since Congress clearly intended CERCLA to
protect the public, and the ongoing violation of the law was not
merely speculative, the court precluded the bankruptcy trustee from
abandoning the property. 18
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
117. Id. at 947.
118. Id. at 947-48.
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CONCLUSION
In Penn Terra Limited v. Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources,1 19 the Third Circuit enunciated a rule which
prevented litigation from going forward when the government sought
to obtain a money judgment from a debtor, but permitted the
government to maintain suit under the police and regulatory power
exception when the government was legitimately trying to force the
debtor to comply with environmental laws. Some courts have
expanded the Penn Terra rule to allow the government to proceed to
establish debtor's liability for environmental damage. In those cases,
the government was not allowed to enforce the judgment, but it was
then granted a perfected claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.
In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection,120 the Supreme Court enunciated a rule
which, unlike Penn Terra, has become more compatible with the
needs of bankrupt businesses that face potential environmental
liability. Midlantic prohibited the bankruptcy trustee from abandoning
environmentally damaged property in contravention of state law when
abandonment would create an imminent danger to the public. More
recent cases have interpreted Midlantic in a less restrictive manner so
as to allow abandonment as long as the trustee has taken adequate
steps to safeguard the property, and the state cannot prove that
imminent harm is likely to result from the abandonment.
Finally, Ohio v. Kovacs121 established that an environmental
obligation was dischargeable in bankruptcy when it was a claim for
a monetary judgment. The ruling was fact-specific and held that
since a receiver had been appointed for the debtor's assets, the
equitable claim had been converted to an action seeking purely
monetary relief. Courts have expanded the Kovacs rule to allow
119. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
120. 474 U.S. 494 (1985).
121. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
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discharge when the claimant requests compliance with an
environmental law that would require the expenditure of money.
Both the Midlantic and Kovacs lines of cases are similar in that
subsequent rulings generally show greater concern for protecting the
debtor, while the Penn Terra line of cases is more concerned with
protecting the environment.
As the number of bankruptcy filings grows, the tension
increases between the policies of bankruptcy and environmental
legislation. Courts are increasingly faced with balancing the health
and safety goals of environmental legislation against a corporation's
right to a fresh start under the Bankruptcy Code. To maintain the
integrity of both areas of the law, courts should not allow bankruptcy
to become a shield protecting corporations from all environmental
responsibility. The mechanisms of the Bankruptcy Code should be
interpreted to complement environmental policies and legislation
wherever possible.
